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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------
In the matter of the Mental 
Condition of 
THOMAS WAHLQUIST. 
Case No. 15702 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
After a hearing held pursuant to U.C.A. 1953, 
§64-7-36 on August 1, 1977, appellant was hospitalized 
as a patient in the Weber County Mental Health Center 
by order of Judge J. Duffy Palmer, Second Judical Dis-
trict Court for Weber County. Upon appellant's petition 
for re-examination of the order of hospitalization, a 
hearing was held on February 21, 1978, at which time the 
order of hospitalization was continued, and appellant 
was transferred to the Utah State Hospital pursuant to 
U.C.A. 1953, §64-7-41. This appeal challenges the 
procedures followed in the February 21, 1978, re-exam-
ination hearing. 
DISPOSTION IN THE LOWER COURT 
on August 1, 1977, appellant was found to be mentally 
ill, in need of care and treatment, and because of his 
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illness unable to carry through with a voluntary 
treatment program, U.C.A. 1953, §64-7-36. Con-
sequently, by order of Judge J. Duffy Palmer, Second 
Judicial District Court, appellant was hospitalized 
in the Weber County Mental Health Center. That order 
was continued after a hearing on February 21, 1978, 
and appellant was transferred to the Utah State Hospital. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the order of 
hospitalization and denial of appellant's request for 
a new hearing to be held on his petition for re-exam-
ination of the order of hospitalization. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees generally with the statement of 
facts presented by appellant. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 
2-4). 
ARGUMENT 
THE HEARING IN THE LOWER COURT WAS HELD 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATUTORY STANDARDS, 
AND APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY HOSPITALIZED 
AT THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL. 
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As appellant states at page 5 of his brief, this 
appeal centers upon a single issue - - the procedural 
requirements of §64-7-45. This section allows a patient 
who has been committed to a mental health facility 
pursuant to §64-7-36 to have periodic reviews of the 
order of hospitalization, either upon his own petition 
or that of a relative or friend. The pertinent text 
of §64-7-45 follows: 
"Any patient hospitalized pursuant to 
section 64-7-36 shall be entitled to a 
re-examination of the order for hospital-
ization on the patient's own petition, or 
that of the legal guardian, parent, spouse, 
relative, or friend, to the district court 
of the county in which the patient resides 
or is detained. Upon receipt of the petition, 
the court shall conduct or cause to be con-
ducted by a mental health commissioner pro-
ceedings in accordance with such section 
64-7-36,. . " 
Appellant focuses on the word re-examination in the 
first sentence of this statute, (Appellant's Brief, p. 
5), but disregards the substance of the rest of the 
sentence. The rules of statutory analysis, as cited by 
appellant, require the court to presume that the words 
and phrases were chosen advisedly to express legislative 
intent. (Appellant's Brief, p. 5, citing Gord v. Salt 
Lake City, 434 P.2d 499, 451 (Utah, 1967)). However, 
it certainly would not comport with either legislative 
intent or rules of construction to analyze a statute 
-3-
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one word at a time, focusing on the general definition 
of one word without regard for the position and function 
of the word in the context of the sentence. Indeed,' 
the rule cited by appellant states that words and 
phrases are chosen advisedly and must be given their 
clear and everyday meaning. "Phrase" refers to several 
words which, when taken togethe4 express a single thought 
or idea. So in determining what re-examination means 
in the context of §64-7-45, it might be helpful to 
look at the complete sentence rather than the word 
standing alone. 
Respondent does not dispute that the word "re-
examination" has the dictionary definition of "a second 
or new examination". (Appellant's Brief, p. 6). But 
in the context of §64-7-45, it is important to look at 
the object of the re-examination. It is the order, not 
patient, which must be re-examined according to this statu 
"Any patient hospitalized pursuant to section 64-7-36 
shall be entitled to a re-examination of the order for 
hospitalization ••• II u.c.A. §64-7-45. 
Section 64-7-36(6) requires evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a proposed patient: 
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(a) is mentally ill, and 
(b) is dangerous to himself or others, or 
(c) is in need of custodial care and treatment, and 
because of his illness either 
(i) lackssufficient insight to make responsible 
decisions as to his need for care and treat-
ment, or 
(ii) lacks sufficient capacity to provide himself 
with the basic necessities of life, and 
(d) there is no less restrictive alternative to a 
court order of hospitalization. 
(See §64-7-36(6)). 
Thus, the hearing held pursuant to §64-7-36 must be an 
extensive evidentiary procedure, and it requires that the 
mental condition of the proposed patient be thoroughly 
examined by impartial, court-designated examiners. On 
the other hand, the purpose of a hearing pursuant to 
§64-7-45 is to review and re-examine the order which 
was made after an affirmative finding, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, of all of the substantive elements of §64-7-36, 
to determine that those conditions are still present and 
the order remains valid. The court must determine that 
all of those conditions still exist, and that they have 
not altered sufficiently to warrant the patient's 
release. Whereas designated examiners are necessary 
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under §64-7-36 to facilitate the court's findings as to 
the mental illness and the capabilities of a proposed 
patient, they would not necessarily be required for 
that same purpose in a re-examination hearing. After a 
period of time in treatment in the mental health system, 
the patient's present condition and progress are best 
known by those who have cared for and treated him during 
that time. Because the whole purpose of having a re-
examination hearing is to allow the court to evaluate 
the progress of the patient and to determine if he 
should remain hospitalized, it is to the doctors who 
have observed and participated in that progress that the 
court should look for testimony in a re-examination hearir 
It is therefore apparent that, contrary to appellant' 
assertions, it is not a requirement under §64-7-45 that 
the court even appoint designated examiners, especially 
examiners who have had no prior contact with the patient. 
The only basis that appellant has for claiming that 
designated examiners must be appointed for a re-examinati' 
hearing is the language in §64-7-45 which states that 
upon receipt of a petition for re-examination the court 
"shall conduct or cause to be conducted by a mental healt: 
commissioner proceedings in accordance with such section 
64-7-36, ..•• " In other words, a re-examination heari~ 
must conform to the same procedural standards as the 
-6-
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original commitment hearing must under §64-7-36. However, 
not every provision of §64-7-36 applies to a re-examination 
hearing. 
Section 64-7-45 outlines its own petitioning process, 
so the provisions of §64-7-36(1) do not apply. Most of 
the provisions of §64-7-36(2) are applicable only to 
prospective patients who are not currently hospitalized 
or under the care of a mental health facility, and thus 
have no relevance to §64-7-45. Similarly, §64-7-36 (3) 
can only logically be applied to the prospective patient, 
not to one who, as appellant, is already in a hospital and 
under the custody of the Division of Mental Health. 
It is obvious, then, that appellant cannot argue that 
all provisions of §64-7-36 must be applied in an identical 
manner to a re-examination hearing under §64-7-45. Just 
as sub-sections (1), (2), and (3) of §64-7-36 cannot be 
applied to the re-examination procedure, neither can 
sub-section (4), which discusses the appointment of 
designated examiners. In the original commitment process, the 
court has had no experience with the patient, and must 
appoint two examiners to facilitate the evidentiary 
findings required by §64-7-36. However, as previously 
discussed, after at least six months in the custody of 
a mental health institution, the best evidence as to 
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the patient's present condition is going to come from 
those who have treated him during his hospitalization 
or confinement. There is no longer any real purpose to 
be served by court-appointed designated examiners. Thus, 
just as sub-sections (1), (2), and (3) of §64-7-36 are not 
incorporated in §64-7-45, neither is sub-section (4), 
and designated examiners need not be appointed for a 
re-examination hearing. 
The phrase in §64-7-45 which states that proceedin~ 
must be held in accordance with §64-7-36 undoubtedly 
was intended to incorporate those provisions of section 36 
which could logically and usefully be applied in a re-
examination hearing. For example, sub-section (5) of 
§64-7-36 guarantees to mental patients the procedural 
rights afforded to parties to criminal proceedings by the 
United States Constitution. Sub-section (5) sets forth 
the basic procedures for a mental health hearing which 
would be equally applicable to both initial commitment 
hearings and re-examination hearings. Likewise, the 
substantive aspects of sub-section (6) are also applic~l 
to a re-examination hearing. However, at least portions 
of sub-sections (7) through (10), when read closely, can 
only logically apply to the original commitment proceedir 
for proposed patients, and cannot be utilized in a re-
examination proceeding. It is thus clear that when the 
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legislature said in §64-7-45 that the proceeding should 
be conducted in accordance with §64-7-36, it did not 
mean that section 36 was to be incorporated part and 
parcel into section 45. One of the unincorporated 
portions must be sub-section (4), because designated 
examiners are unnecessary in a re-examination hearing. 
Because the court was not required to appoint 
designated examiners at all, there was no error in the 
present case when Dr. Hansen and Dr. Schmidt were appointed 
to testify in the present case. Their testimony was 
undoubtedly helpful to the court in determining that the 
conditions which originally necessitated the appellant's 
hospitalization (of which Dr. Hansen had particular 
knowledge) still existed and that hospitalization was 
still necessary (to which fact Dr. Schmidt was particularly 
qualified to testify). These two doctors were called 
"designated examiners" because of the judge's apparent 
assumption that because appellant requested designated 
examiners, he had to appoint them, as he does in a 
commitment proceeding under §64-7-36. However, as has 
been seen, there is no such requirement for a re-examination 
hearing. Nevertheless, the testimony of Dr. Hansen and of 
Dr. Schmidt was certainly admissible in the February 21 
hearing simply in their capacities as doctors who had know-
ledge of the appellant's condition, and there was no error 
-9-
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in admitting their testimony. 
Appellant's second point in his brief (p. 11) is 
really only an extension of his first, and must fali on 
the same basis. Appellant argues that Dr. Hansen was 
required to re-examine him, and because he did not do so 
that the statutory process was violated. That argument 
fails in two ways. First, it was not even necessary 
that designated examiners be appointed, and thus appell~ 
cannot base his argument on the duties of a designated 
examiner because they are not applicable in a §64-7-45 
hearing. Second, §64-7-45 states that the order, not the 
patient, must be re-examined, so appellant's lengthy 
discussion regarding the meaning of "re-examination" is 
not applicable to the patient and the condition of his 
mental health. Dr. Hansen was certainly competent to 
testify as to appellant's condition when the original 
hospitalization order was entered, and as the court had 
to determine that appellant's condition had not changed 
significantly, Dr. Hansen's testimony was relevant and 
helpful. Again, no error was committed by the trial court 
in conducting the hearing under §64-7-45. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant was hospitalized in August because his 
mental condition required that he receive custodial care 
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and treatment. As allowed by statute, appellant was 
granted a hearing after six months in the mental health 
system to determine whether he was still in need of such 
care and treatment. That hearing was conducted in 
accordance with the requirements of §64-7-45, and the 
appellant remains properly hospitalized at the Utah State 
Hospital. 
Respondent therefore requests that the order of the 
lower court be affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
PAUL M. TINKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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